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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to analyze the relationship between family involvement and entry 
mode choice by Spanish hotel chains in foreign markets. Drawing on stewardship and 
institutional theories, we examine how family character may moderate the effect of 
institutional differences on the choice of entry modes entailing different levels of resource 
commitment and control over international activities. Using a sample of 981 hotels 
established abroad by 76 Spanish hotel chains, the results show that family involvement is 
associated with entry modes involving greater control and resource commitment. Moreover, 
family involvement moderates the relationship between both formal and informal institutional 
distance and entry mode choice. Specifically, when both distances are high, family 
involvement increases the likelihood of choosing entry modes involving higher control and 
resource commitment. 
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Introduction 
Even though family businesses (FBs) have traditionally grown within domestic markets, 
many of them have been compelled to go abroad in order to survive in highly competitive and 
globalized markets (Kontinen & Ojala, 2010). Hence, FBs’ internationalization has become 
one of the most outstanding phenomena in the last few decades (Arregle, Duran, Hitt & van 
Essen, 2017). However, prior studies failed to obtain conclusive results on whether these 
firms have a higher propensity to internationalize than non-family businesses (NFBs) due to 
the wide range of theories from which this topic has been addressed.  
Building upon the socio-emotional wealth (SEW) perspective, Gómez-Mejía, Makri 
and Larraza (2010) found that FBs showed a lower level of internationalization than NFBs 
due to their desire to keep control in the family’s hands. Other obstacles for the international 
expansion of FBs are lack of capital and resources, absence of a professionalized management, 
reluctance to change, family conflicts, and risk aversion (Arregle et al., 2017; Fernández & 
Nieto, 2005; Sciascia, Mazzola, Astrachan & Pieper, 2012).  
Nevertheless, there is an opposite view that stresses the positive attributes of these 
firms leading them to a greater level of internationalization. The executives’ strong 
identification with the motivations of the firm, flexibility, faster decision-making, and long-
term orientation can encourage managers to carry out riskier strategies such as 
internationalization (Zahra, 2003). Theories related to the behavior of managers strongly 
identified with the firm (such as the stewardship theory) help to reinforce the arguments 
underpinning this point of view that suggests a higher level of internationalization by FBs. As 
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pointed out by Eddleston and Kellermanns (2007), the stewardship theory is a suitable 
perspective in viewing the family as a resource instead of a limitation. 
Other possible explanations for this lack of consensus on the link between FBs and 
internationalization are the variety of measures used to conceptualize family character (Boyle, 
Pollack & Rutherford, 2012) and the influence exerted by other variables such as industry and 
institutional factors (Arregle et al., 2017). For that reason, Kontinen and Ojala (2010) suggest 
the need to carry out further studies about FBs focusing on specific industries, in particular 
service industries, since past research mainly focused on manufacturing sectors. Furthermore, 
most prior studies on FBs analyzed small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), paying less 
attention to larger firms. Therefore, our study fulfills this twofold requirement, since it refers 
to a single service sector −the Spanish hotel sector− and does not exclusively focus on SMEs, 
since it includes all the internationalized FBs that operate in this industry.  
The Spanish hotel industry has a high percentage of FBs (Andreu, Claver, Quer & 
Rienda, 2018). Besides, in recent decades, this sector has experienced an explosive growth 
and has reached a high level of internationalization (Andreu, Claver & Quer, 2017a; Brida, 
Driha, Ramón & Scuderi, 2015). However, to our knowledge, no studies have discussed the 
extent to which the family character influences the international strategies of Spanish hotel 
firms. Thus, this study aims to provide new evidence about the relationship between family 
character and international decisions by Spanish hotel chains, in particular, those related to 
entry mode choice in foreign markets. More precisely, drawing on the stewardship and 
institutional theories, our aim is to investigate whether the family character of Spanish hotel 
firms moderates the relationship between institutional differences and the choice of entry 
modes involving higher levels of control and resource commitment. 
Our study develops several contributions. First, it complements the literature on FB 
internationalization from the stewardship perspective within a service sector that has received 
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less attention. Moreover, we provide new evidence about the role played by family character 
when it comes to institutional factors and entry mode choice −an under-researched topic in the 
FB literature. Our study additionally provides new empirical evidence about entry strategies 
in the hotel industry, which has certain peculiarities (Chen & Dimou, 2005; Dimou, Chen & 
Archer, 2003; Kruesi, Hemmington & Kim, 2018) and is under-explored compared to 
manufacturing industries (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; Kruesi, Kim & Hemmington, 2017; 
Pla & Ghauri, 2012). 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section examines entry mode decisions by 
FBs in the hotel industry. Based on the stewardship and institutional theories, we propose 
several hypotheses regarding how family character influences entry mode choice. Then, we 
describe our empirical research and report the main findings. After the discussion of our 
results, we highlight the contributions and limitations of our paper and suggest future research 
lines on this topic. 
 
Theory and hypotheses 
Entry modes by FBs in the hotel industry 
Even though the stewardship theory has been available for some decades, its application to 
FBs is quite recent (Miller, Le Breton-Miller & Scholnick, 2008). One of its basic principles 
is that managers’ interests can be aligned with those of the owners (Lee & O’Neill, 2003). 
This theory was proposed by Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson (1997) as an alternative 
perspective to the limitations of agency theory. Agency theory is built on the assumption of 
interest divergence (agency problem) between shareholders (principals) and top managers that 
can behave as agents and seek maximize their own utility (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). This 
agency relationship is associated with the separation of ownership and control. In FBs, if both 
ownership and management were under the control of the family, this duality of interests 
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would be less probable–or even could not exist. In these firms, it is more likely that there is an 
identification of managers with the organization. Managers are not motivated by individual 
goals, but rather are stewards whose motives are aligned with the objectives of their principals 
(Davis et al., 1997).  
The business is considered as a way to support the family in the future, giving 
continuity and security to the next generations (Miller et al., 2008). For that reason, these 
firms invest in creating conditions to ensure long-term profits for all family members 
(Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). In their efforts 
to guarantee continuity and survival, FBs will most probably undertake fast growth strategies, 
which may lead them to gain a larger market share or even to expand toward new markets. 
Thus, Zahra (2003) proposes that higher family involvement has a positive effect on the 
decision to enter international markets. This suggests that FBs accept the risk associated with 
internationalization, or they perceive lower risk–i.e. they are less risk-averse. 
Entry mode choice is a key decision of the internationalization process. The options 
available for hotel firms to establish in other countries may be grouped together around two 
large categories, depending on whether foreign direct investment (FDI) is carried out or not. 
Firms choose ways that involve an FDI when they want to maximize control and are in a 
position to assume greater resource commitment and a higher risk level. Otherwise, firms will 
opt for contractual agreements. Within the former category, referred to as ‘asset-light’ modes, 
management contracts and franchising are the most common in the hotel industry (Dimou et 
al., 2003; Kruesi et al., 2017). In management contracts, hotel chain selects the hotel manager, 
implements their policies, their systems and procedures and is responsible for all hotel 
operations. The hotel is managed as if it was owned by the chain (Pla, León & Villar, 2011). 
In franchise agreements, the chain does not manage the hotel. It gives their brand name to the 
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owner of the hotel whose controls the daily operations and physical assets (León, Villar & Pla, 
2011). 
Anyway, it is worth mentioning that hotel chains also use lease agreements or leasing. 
In leasing, the hotel chain rents a building and runs the entire operation independently. It may 
be considered as a contractual entry mode, even though in practice it would lie closer to 
ownership-based modes. In the context of this study, lease agreements can be treated in the 
same way as equity modes. They are an ‘asset-heavy’, risky and costly way to develop 
operations. With lease agreements, the balance sheet would become too heavy by having 
continual lease payments as fixed expenses (Kruesi et al., 2018). 
When it comes to entry mode choice, ownership is equivalent to control and, therefore, 
increasing ownership means increasing control (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992). However, the 
separation between management and ownership (‘bricks and brains’ split) of the non-equity 
entry modes used in the international hotel industry makes it possible to retain control over 
operations regardless of the capital investments. Contractor and Kundu (1998) classify entry 
modes in the hotel sector based on the degree of control over daily management and service 
quality, physical assets, tacit expertise, and codified strategic assets. Fully owned hotels are 
the entry mode that provides a higher control over all the criteria. On the opposite side would 
be franchising that only provide strong control over strategic assets while having lower level 
of resource commitment. A management contract provides more strategic and operational 
control than franchising, but is more resource intensive (Kruesi at al., 2017). 
From the stewardship perspective, family members involved in managing and 
operating the business could promote the firm’s propensity toward risk taking. As Vargas 
(2001) points out, one of the differences with regard to the agency theory is that stewardship 
theory defends that the principal or owner has more risk propensity. The stronger 
identification with the values of the firm and the family may lead FBs to prioritize such 
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feelings when they adopt strategic decisions such as internationalization. FBs may prefer to 
keep control over international activities because of their stronger commitment to the firm, 
along with their desire of protection. Therefore, these companies may choose entry modes 
that involve higher resource commitment, despite the higher risk. The desire to control the 
firm will grow when FBs have several family members actively involved in the firm’s 
management and ownership (Miller et al., 2008). Accordingly, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Family firm involvement is positively associated with the choice of entry 
modes involving higher control and resource commitment. 
 
Institutional environment, family firm character and entry mode by hotel chains  
Some of the most influential factors on entry mode decisions are the political, social and 
economic systems that shape the institutional environment–both of the host and the home 
countries. This institutional context establishes the rules of the game in a society and 
determines the behavior of social players (North, 1990). The institutional theory helps to 
explain how formal institutions (such as political rules, legal decisions and economic 
measures) and informal ones (behavioral patterns, identity, customs and traditions embedded 
in culture and ideology) influence firm’s behavior (Peng, 2000).  
As for the analysis on how the institutional context determines the entry mode, we can 
separately consider the influence of formal and informal institutions, because differences are 
likely to exist. Therefore, two different but related lines of research have examined the impact 
of these two institutional components in the strategic decision-making of the company, 




Formal and informal institutional differences between host and home countries 
increase the external uncertainty associated with establishing in a foreign destination. This 
situation is perceived as riskier and will most probably influence the entry strategy (Chen, Cui, 
Li & Rolfe, 2017). In relation to formal institutions, the risk level perceived will depend on 
the differences and similarities between the standards and rules of the game established in the 
destination country and those prevailing in the country of origin. The greater the formal 
institutional difference, the harder it will be for the firm to establish in that country due to 
factors such as higher economic risk, greater political uncertainty, existence of asymmetric 
information, higher administrative and organizational costs, and riskier relationships with 
local institutions (Pinto, Ferreira, Falaster, Fleury & Fleury, 2017). Consequently, the firm 
will have greater difficulties and costs to establish and do business in that country. This can 
lead it to use entry modes that entail smaller resource investment, but also less control over 
the international activity. In this case, a negative relationship between formal institutional 
differences and the entry by means of modes implying higher control and resource 
commitment could be expected (Brouthers 2002; Pak & Park, 2004). 
In turn, informal institutional distance is mainly related to differences in terms of 
culture between host and home countries (Schwens, Eiche & Kabst, 2011). Cultural distance 
stands out as one of the variables most commonly utilized to measure external uncertainty 
(Zhao, Luo & Suh, 2004). Cultural distance refers to the possible differences existing between 
the way in which individuals from different countries observe certain behaviors, which will 
affect the validity of the transfer of working practices and methods from one country to 
another (Hofstede, 1980). Greater cultural differences between countries increase the costs 
and risks associated with doing business in the host country. Despite the lack of consensus on 
the sign of the relationship between cultural distance and entry modes, numerous studies have 
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proved that a negative relationship exists with modes involving higher resource investment 
(Brown, Dev & Zhou, 2003; Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Pak & Park, 2004). 
Anyway, the behavior shown by FBs when choosing an entry mode may differ from 
that of NFBs (Kraus, Mensching, Calabrò, Cheng and Filser, 2016). This makes necessary to 
complement the insights derived from the institutional theory, since very few studies have 
dealt with the effects of institutions on the entry strategies by FBs (Wright, Chrisman, Chua & 
Steier, 2014). 
As we stated above, the family’s involvement in the business may reduce owner-
managers’ perceptions of the risks associated with complex investment decisions during the 
internationalization process (James, 1999). As a consequence, FBs could choose entry modes 
that imply higher resource commitment and ensure more control over foreign activities, 
despite the higher risks that they entail when there are institutional differences between 
countries (Kraus et al., 2016).  
As a result, the negative relationship between formal and informal institutional 
differences and the choice of entry modes that entail higher resource commitment and control 
may be moderated by family involvement. This leads us to propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2: Family firm character moderates the negative relationship between 
formal institutional differences and the choice of entry modes involving higher control 
and resource commitment, in such a way that the impact will decrease as family 
involvement grows. 
Hypothesis 3: Family firm character moderates the negative relationship between 
informal institutional differences and the choice of entry modes involving higher 
control and resource commitment, in such a way that the impact will decrease as 




Figure 1 depicts the conceptual model we propose. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
Methodology and data 
Data collection 
The Spanish hotel chains listed in the 2016 Alimarket Hotel and Catering Yearbook were 
selected to test our hypotheses. This database brings together financial and commercial data 
of the most important hotel chains with headquarters based in Spain (including both national 
chains and international groups establish in this country). To build the database, we removed 
duplicated observations, data on companies and funds only owning hotel properties, firms 
specialized in the operation of establishments with third-party trademarks, as well as 
independent hotel groups–also known as voluntary chains.  
The original database included 697 hotel chains. Our study only analyzed international 
chains, namely, those having hotels outside Spain whether they are on a franchise, 
management, lease agreements or ownership basis. Finally, we identified 76 international 
Spanish hotel chains with 981 hotels abroad, this being the sample of our study. Table 1 
reports a description of the sample. 
 Insert Table 1 about here 
Dependent variable 
Entry mode. Based on previous studies (Berbel & Ramírez, 2011; Contractor & Kundu, 1998; 
García de Soto & Vargas, 2015; Ivanova & Ivanov, 2014; Ramón, 2002), we defined a 
variable coded with four categories: (1) when the firm operates the hotel abroad under a 
franchise agreement; (2) when the firm operates it under a management agreement; (3) if the 
hotel is operated on a lease contract; and (4) if the firm has the partial or total ownership and 
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management of the foreign establishment1. This variable represents an ordinal scale of the 
degree of control and resource commitment. While both franchising and management 
agreements are contractual forms, management agreements offer more operational and 
strategic control, thus being closer to a quasi-internalized transaction (Contractor & Kundu, 
1998; Pla, Sánchez & Madhok, 2010). Besides, despite not entailing large investments, 
management contracts involve a certain level of resource commitment. This is because the 
need to transfer assets–such as knowledge for local management training or the expatriation 
of staff from one country to another–, as well as the pre-opening costs and the need to obtain 
local information (Dimou et al., 2003). In turn, a franchising agreement not only means lesser 
resource commitment but also a lower level of control, thus being a quasi-market transaction 
(Kruesi et al., 2017). Lease contracts (which can almost be considered as an equity-based 
entry mode), and the ownership of hotels abroad are entry modes which, in addition to 
involving higher resource commitment, allow the firm to exert more control (Dimou et al., 
2003; Kruesi et al., 2017, 2018). 
Explanatory variables 
Formal institutional distance. To operationalize formal institutional differences, we based on 
the six dimensions of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank for 
measuring the governance infrastructure quality of a country (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 
2009): voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Drawing on these 
dimensions, we calculated the formal institutional distance between Spain and each host 
country using the same methodology developed by the Kogut and Singh’s (1988) index for 
measuring cultural distance between countries (Malhotra & Gaur, 2014; Slangen, 2011). Thus, 
we measured formal institutional distance as follows:  
                                                             




ID𝑗 =  ∑{
6
i=1
(I𝑖𝑗 − I𝑖𝑠𝑝)2 / V𝑖}/6 
Where IDj is the formal institutional distance between country j and Spain, Iij is 
country j’s score on the ith institutional dimension, Iisp is the score of Spain on this dimension, 
and Vi is the variance of the score of the dimension. 
Cultural distance. This variable was used as a proxy of informal institutional differences. We 
measured the cultural distance between Spain and each host country using the Kogut and 
Singh (1988) index, based on the extended Hofstede’s model with six dimensions (Hofstede, 
Hofstede & Minkov, 2010). These dimensions are power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism versus collectivism, masculinity versus femininity, long-term versus short-term 
orientation, and indulgence versus restraint. We calculated cultural distance as follows:  
 
CD𝑗 =  ∑{
6
i=1
(I𝑖𝑗 − I𝑖𝑠𝑝)2 / V𝑖}/6 
Where CDj is the cultural distance between country j and Spain, Iij is country j’s score 
on the ith cultural dimension, Iisp is the score of Spain on this dimension, and Vi is the variance 
of the score of the dimension. 
Moderating variable 
Family involvement. Despite the lack of consensus on how to conceptualize a FB, the two 
most frequently used criteria have been the levels of ownership and management in the 
family’s hands (Abdellatif, Amann & Jaussaud, 2010; Kraus et al., 2016). A FB can be 
defined considering family ownership, management or both (Arregle et al., 2017). We used 
the percentage of the firm’s equity held by the owner family and the percentage of family 
members in board management positions (Zahra, 2003) in order to classify firms into several 
categories. Based on Arregle et al. (2017), we established five mutually exclusive categories: 
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(1) Firms with less than 10 per cent of the firm’s capital  in the hands of the family and less 
than two family managers (this being NFBs)2; (2) Firms with more than 10 per cent of the 
firm’s capital in hands of the family and more than two managers in management positions 
but whose percentage is still minority in both ownership and management (firms with low 
family involvement); (3) Firms with a majority presence of family members in management 
positions but not in ownership (family-managed firms); (4) Firms with a majority percentage 
of family presence in ownership but not in management positions (family-owned firms); (5) 
Firms with a majority family presence in both ownership and management positions (family-
owned and family-managed firms). This variable represents an ordinal scale of family 
involvement and control. Family members with a substantial ownership and top management 
presence allow FBs to exert significant influence on firm’s strategic decisions and operations. 
This provides the family with the opportunity to seek specific family goals (Arregle et al., 
2017). 
Control variables 
We also included a number of control variables that, according to prior research, might also 
influence entry mode choice. 
International experience. International experience is a determinant factor when 
choosing entry modes (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988). International experience allows the 
company to better adapt to the particular host market (Niñerola, Campa, Hernández & 
Sánchez, 2016). Companies without international experience are likely to have more 
difficulties in managing foreign operations, thus preferring entry modes demanding lower 
resource commitment (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992). We measured international experience 
using two variables: the number of years since a firm’s internationalization process began 
(Brida, Ramón, Such & Driha, 2016; Driha & Ramón, 2011; García de Soto & Vargas, 2015; 
                                                             
2 According to Gómez-Mejía et al. (2010), a firm is considered a FB if both of the following conditions are met: 
two or more managers must have a family relationship and family members must hold at least a 10 per cent of 
the firm’s capital stock. 
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León et al. 2011; Martorell, Mulet & Pla, 2013; Pla et al., 2010; 2011; Ramón, 2002); and the 
ratio of rooms abroad to total rooms of each hotel chain (Brida et al., 2016; Lu & Beamish, 
2004; Ramón, 2002; Tallman & Li, 1996).  
Firm size. Firms may adopt different patterns of internationalization based on their 
financial and managerial resource limitations (Brida et al., 2015). Several studies found a 
positive relationship between firm size and equity-based entry modes, since large companies 
have more resources to carry out FDI (Brouthers, 2002; Driha & Ramón, 2011; Pla et al., 
2010). Nevertheless, other researchers reported a negative relationship, since larger firms may 
need to find partners in order to enter specific locations (Brown et al., 2003; Contractor & 
Kundu, 1998; Martorell et al., 2013) or because larger firms possess the capabilities and 
knowledge needed to choose a contractual agreement (León et al., 2011). Hence, we 
controlled for firm size using the average income of each hotel chain in the last three years, 
with a logarithmic transformation to normalize the variable distribution (Brida et al., 2016; 
García de Soto & Vargas, 2015; Ramón, 2002). 
Family generation. Control, influence and emotional attachment have a stronger 
weight in first generations of a FB (Berrone, Cruz & Gómez-Mejía, 2012). Founders try to 
perpetuate their legacy and ensure continued family control (Miller, Steier & LeBreton-Miller, 
2003). Therefore, they may be willing to undertake riskier strategies. Accordingly, Claver, 
Rienda & Quer (2007) found that first generations perceive less risk when doing business 
abroad. To the extent that risk aversion increases with successive generations, the use of non-
equity entry modes could be negatively related to the FB’s generation. Future generations are 
considered as stewards of their inheritance and have a duty to preserve the family position. 
Entering new markets can induce major organizational changes, and this is likely to generate 
resistance from family members as they feel that their degree of control is being threatened 
(Gómez-Mejía et al. 2010). However, Graves and Thomas (2008) argued that successors 
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came with a fresh understanding of the importance of internationalization. Thus, international 
involvement may be encouraged by the presence of the second and subsequent generations 
(Fernández & Nieto, 2005). In line with this reasoning, Claver, Rienda and Quer (2008) found 
a positive relationship between the generation and the choice of entry modes involving higher 
international commitment. Consequently, we controlled for the current generation of the 
family that is running the firm, using a continuous variable. 
Family CEO. The presence of a family CEO can facilitate the alignment of interests 
between ownership and management. Besides, a family CEO may provide a better internal 
control mechanism and better access to resources (Peng & Jiang, 2010). Therefore, if the 
family CEO shows a long-term orientation for firm’s survival, the level of internationalization 
would be positively influenced (Zahra, 2005) since growing across borders helps to 
strengthen the business in the long-run (Pukall & Calabró, 2014). This may favored the use of 
entry modes that allow keeping control in the family hands. Nevertheless, some family CEOs 
may be unqualified (Peng & Jiang, 2010). This lack of professionalization could affect 
strategic decisions on international commitment, thus diminishing the positive influence of 
having a family CEO. Accordingly, based on the studies of Gómez-Mejía et al. (2010) and 
Peng & Jiang (2010), we included a dummy variable with value (1) for those firms where the 
CEO is a family member, and value (0) otherwise. 
Market attractiveness. Past studies in the hotel industry reported a positive relationship 
between host market attractiveness and equity-based entry modes (Driha & Ramón, 2011; 
Martorell et al., 2013; Ramón, 2002). Hence, we also controlled for this factor. Drawing on 
the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO, 2017), we used data on income obtained from 
tourism in each host country with a logarithmic transformation (Andreu, Claver & Quer, 
2017b; León et al., 2011; Pla et al. 2011). 
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Table 2 summarizes the measurement, coding and sources of information used for 
each variable. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Results 
Data were analyzed using SPSS version 24. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics and the 
bivariate correlation matrix. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
We calculated the variance inflation factor (VIF) for all the variables as a 
multicollinearity test. This test measures the extent to which the variances of the coefficients 
estimated in a regression are inflated when compared to the cases in which the independent 
variables are not linearly related. High VIF values can become indicators of the existence of 
multicollinearity. As can be seen, the highest VIF was 4.43, which is below 10, the cut-off 
point recommended by Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter & Li (2005). This allows us to rule out the 
presence of multicollinearity in our data. 
We used an ordinal logistic regression model for hypothesis testing. This regression 
model has been used in past studies on entry mode choice by hotel companies (Contractor & 
Kundu, 1998; Pla et al., 2011; Ramón, 2002). A significant positive coefficient indicates that 
the independent variable increases the probability of choosing entry modes involving higher 
control and resource commitment. As Table 4 shows, we used different models for hypothesis 
testing. Model 1 includes only control variables. Model 2 adds the main effects of the 
explanatory variables and the moderator. Models 3, 4 and 5 examine the moderating influence 
of family involvement, thus including interactions with formal institutional distance (Model 
3), with cultural distance (Model 4) and with both explanatory variables (Model 5).  
Insert Table 4 about here 
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The results of Model 2 show that family involvement is positively associated with a 
preference for choosing entry modes that entail a high control and resource commitment (β = 
0.672, p<0.05). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is supported. Moreover, the direct effect of formal 
institutional distance is negative and highly significant in Model 3 (β = -7.472, p<0.01). The 
interaction term between formal institutional distance and family involvement is positive and 
statistically significant both in Model 3 (β = 1.728, p<0.01) and Model 5 (β = 1.796, p<0.01). 
These findings suggest a positive moderating effect of family involvement, namely, that it 
increases the likelihood of choosing entry modes with high resource commitment despite 
formal institutional differences between countries. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported.  
Model 4 shows a negative and statistically significant effect of cultural distance on the 
choice of entry modes involving a higher control level (β = -1.037, p<0.01). The interaction 
term between cultural distance and family involvement is positive and statistically significant 
in Model 4 (β = 0.269, p<0.01), suggesting that family involvement moderates the 
relationship between cultural distance and high-control entry modes. However, the lack of 
significance of that interaction term in Model 5 leads us to consider Hypothesis 3 only 
partially supported. 
In order to facilitate the interpretation of our findings, we plotted the interaction 
effects. As shown in Figures 2 and 3, the effect of both formal institutional distance and 
cultural distance is negative at low levels of family involvement and turns positive at high 
levels of family involvement. This result indicates that when both distances are high, family 
involvement increases the likelihood of choosing entry modes involving a high level of 
control and resource commitment. This provides further support to Hypothesis 2 and 3. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
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In short, our findings suggest that Spanish hotel chains with high family involvement 
behave in the same way in both cases: when formal and informal institutional distances are 
high, they always seek high control entry modes−the straight line is positive and with a 
similar slope in both Figures. Conversely, those hotel chains with a low family involvement 
prefer entry modes implying lower levels of control and investment when there is a high 
formal and informal institutional distance. 
As for control variables, all of them turn out to be statistically significant in all Models. 
Firm experience shows a positive sign, thus suggesting that Spanish hotel chains with more 
international experience tend to choose riskier entry modes. Firm size shows a negative sign, 
indicating that larger hotel chains prefer a lower resource commitment when choosing entry 
modes. Regarding family generation, the negative association with high control and resource 
commitment suggest a lower risk aversion of the founders compared to the second and 
subsequent generations. Moreover, the presence of a family CEO is positively associated with 
riskier entry strategies. Finally, host market attractiveness has a positive association with the 
decision to invest more resources abroad. 
Robustness tests 
Finally, we conducted several robustness tests in order to confirm that our findings are not 
due to an idiosyncrasy of the empirical model and/or estimation strategy (Meyer, van 
Witteloostuijn & Beugelsdijk, 2017). The results of robustness tests are reported in Table 5.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
First, in Models 2a, 3a and 4a we performed the hypothesis test using the percentage 
of family members in management positions as an alternative measure of the moderating 
variable (Miller, Le Breton-Miller & Lester, 2010; Sciascia et al., 2012; Zahra, 2003). Second, 
in Models 2b, 3b and 4b we repeated the test considering only the subsample of FBs, i.e., 
19 
 
excluding NFBs–firms with less than a 10 per cent of the firm’s capital stock in hands of the 
family and less than two managers with a family relationship (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010).  
Finally, in Models 2c, 3c and 4c we included some additional firm- and host country-
specific control variables that may also affect entry mode choice of hotel companies (Andreu 
et al., 2017b; Brown & Dev, 2000; Contractor & Kundu, 1998; Chen & Dimou, 2005; García 
de Soto & Vargas, 2015; León et al, 2011; Martorell et al., 2013; Pla et al. 2011). These 
variables are the number of stars of each hotel (as a proxy of resource intangibility), the 
number of countries where the hotel chain has foreign establishments (as a proxy of firm’s 
geographic scope), the number of employees (as an alternative measure of firm size), and 
political risk (as a measure of institutional instability in the host country)3. Some of these 
variables were not included in our main analysis because they were correlated with other 
variables. The results of these robustness tests are similar to those reported in Table 4. 
 
Discussion 
Drawing on stewardship and institutional theories, our aim has been to analyze how the 
family character of Spanish hotel chains affects entry mode choice, in particular, whether it 
moderates the influence of the institutional environment on that decision. 
Our results suggest that family involvement is positively related to entry modes that 
entail more control and resource commitment. From the stewardship perspective, we argue 
that FBs’ managers are stewards motivated by organizational goals due to the socio-emotional 
link between owners and managers. Consequently, the business is considered as a way to 
support the family in the future, giving continuity and security to next generations. This desire 
                                                             
3 Regarding intangible resources, it could be expected that the larger the number of intangible assets in a hotel, 
the greater the control that a hotel chain needs to exert in order to meet quality standards. Intangible assets grow 
as the number of stars increases (Brown & Dev, 2000). As for geographic scope, prior studies used it as a proxy 
of international experience, suggesting that it could also affect entry mode choice (Lu & Beamish, 2004; 
Tallman & Li, 1996). More precisely, a greater geographic scope, namely, a higher international experience, will 
increase the likelihood of choosing equity-based entry modes (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992; Contractor & 
Kundu, 1998).  
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of preserve the organization reduce owner-managers’ perceptions of the risks associated with 
investment decisions when entering foreign countries. Thus, Spanish hotel chains that are FBs 
prefer entry modes that allow them to keep control over international activities.  
Our findings also support the moderating effect of family involvement. Family 
involvement moderates the negative relationship between formal institutional distance and the 
level of control and investment of the entry mode chosen, proposed by the institutional theory. 
When family involvement is high, the relationship between formal institutional distance and 
equity entry modes becomes positive. In other words, Spanish family hotel chains tend to 
prefer high-control entry modes when there is a high formal institutional distance, thus being 
risk-willing instead of risk-averse.  
Moreover, our findings show that family involvement moderates the relationship 
between cultural distance and entry mode choice. Hence, as the cultural distance increases, 
Spanish hotel chains with a higher family involvement prefer to use entry modes involving a 
higher control and resource commitment. Consequently, we can point out that, in destinations 
with greater informal institutional differences, Spanish family hotel chains also show a more 
risk-willing behavior, choosing entry modes that allow them to retain more control over 
international operations. However, our findings regarding the interplay between family 
involvement and cultural distance are less conclusive in comparison with those of the 
interplay between family involvement and formal institutional distance. 
As stated above, many prior studies reported a negative association between cultural 
distance and the choice of high control and commitment entry modes. However, cultural 
distance not only increases the difficulty to find an appropriate local partner, but also 
generates additional costs when transferring know-how because of the differences in norms 
and routines (Contractor & Kundu, 1998; Gaur & Lu, 2007). Furthermore, Chen and Hu 
(2002) suggest that the little familiarity with target country’s culture and local managers gives 
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investors incentives to internalize so that subsidiaries can be more efficiently controlled. As 
Villar, Pla and León (2012) argued, internalization through subsidiaries will prevent hotel 
firms from opportunistic behavior by partners and ensure that the operation develops in 
accordance with the standards demanded by the hotel chain. This provides a protection 
against the local partner’s inability to execute correctly the routines and procedures required.  
Therefore, the relationship between cultural distance and equity-based entry modes could also 
be positive, as we obtained in Model 2. 
 
Conclusions 
To our knowledge, no studies dealt with the internationalization of FBs in the Spanish hotel 
industry, even though this sector is characterized by a high presence of such firms. In doing so, 
we applied insights from the institutional theory to the context of FBs, combining them with 
the stewardship theory perspective, which suggest that FBs are less risk-averse. Our findings 
report a positive association between family involvement and more risky entry modes. 
Besides, family involvement moderates the relationship between formal and informal 
institutional differences and entry mode choice by Spanish hotel chains.  
Contributions and implications 
Our study provides theoretical arguments and empirical evidence to support the notion that 
FBs differ from NFBs in their internationalization strategies, more precisely, when choosing 
entry modes. From a theoretical point of view, we argued that stewardship theory is 
applicable when analyzing international strategies of Spanish family hotel chains. In addition, 
we have integrated stewardship and institutional theories in order to investigate whether 
family involvement influences entry mode decisions in institutionally distant host countries. 
Since cross-country institutional differences have been overlooked in prior empirical research 
on FBs (Arregle et al., 2017), our study provides new evidence on the relationship between 
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formal and informal institutional differences and family involvement. Furthermore, the link 
between FBs and entry modes abroad has received less attention in the FB literature (Claver 
et al., 2007). Thus, we contribute with new empirical evidence on this topic. Our study also 
provides new insights on entry mode choice by hotel chains, whose peculiarities have been 
under-researched in comparison with manufacturing firms (Kruesi et al., 2018; Pla & Ghauri, 
2012). 
Regarding managerial and policy implications, our study can encourage FB managers 
to place the emphasis on the different local institutional contexts, insofar as the institutional 
environment is becoming a key determinant of entry mode choice. It can also help home 
country’s administrations to take an interest in adapting the regulations or making it easier for 
FBs to enter those destinations with which the home country has fewer institutional 
similarities. Actually, government policy shapes the environment in which firms operate by 
setting the rules of the game through policy formation and regulations that affect firm 
behavior (Nguyen, Kim & Papanastassiou, 2018). Thus, entry modes implying lesser resource 
commitment, such as franchising, could be used to a greater extent by FBs, provided that the 
necessary conditions exist to ensure a suitable relationship with foreign partners.  
Limitations and future research 
We would also point out the limitations of our study that open avenues for future research. 
First, we based our empirical analysis on secondary data sources. For this reason, we were 
unable to capture the managers’ perceptions on how institutional differences matter when 
choosing entry modes, the influence of different types of FB managers, their motivations and 
strategic objectives during international expansion, the level of professionalization and how 
long the manager has been working at the company. The ability of the family managers to 
bring about a commitment to internationalization may depend on their capability in gaining 
the consensus of the family owners (Graves & Thomas, 2008).  
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In our study, we assume that managers behave like stewards when they are members 
of the family. In this situation, they can undertake more risky international strategies in order 
to ensure the company continuity and survival. However, using secondary data does not allow 
us to ensure that their interests are truly aligned with those of the owners. The assumption that 
FBs have heterogeneous characteristics and behavior is gaining increasing importance in 
recent years (Cabrera, 2012). Families may be very diverse because they have not only a 
different culture but also specific values, behavioral patterns and relationships. Therefore, it 
would be necessary to examine these differences in more depth, insofar as they can explain 
different international strategic behaviors. Future studies could collect primary data in order 
to overcome these limitations. 
Moreover, our study focuses on a single industry from a particular country, which 
means that the results cannot be extrapolated to other industries and countries. Future studies 
could perform a multilevel analysis considering a macro level (country) to prove the effect 
that the home country has on entry mode choice by FBs (Peng & Jiang, 2010).  
In addition, other variables could be included in future research such as the financial 
situation of the FB prior to make the decision on going global. Using debt to expand abroad 
may increase the likelihood of agency conflicts between debtholders and shareholders (Zahra, 
2003). Finally, the influence of family involvement on performance is another topic that has 
received attention in the FB literature (Boyle et al., 2012; García-Castro & Aguilera, 2014; 
Kim & Gao, 2013). Hence, the performance implications of the interplay between family 
character and institutional factors when choosing entry modes would be another promising 
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Table 1: Sample description 
  Number of entries abroad 
Entry mode 
Franchise 256 
Management contract 51 
Lease contract 266 
Ownership (FDI) 408 
Family involvement 
NFBs 385 
Firms with low family involvement 4 
Family-managed firms 5 
Family-owned firms 466 
Family-owned and managed firms 121 
Family generation 
First generation 78 
Second generation 294 
Third generation 68 
Fourth generation 156 
Family CEO 
Family CEO 584 
Non-family CEO 397 
Top 10 destinations 
Mexico 121 
Germany 114 
























Table 2: Variable description 
Variable Measurement and coding Information source 
Entry mode 
(1) Franchise; (2) Management 
contract; (3) Lease contract; (4) 
Ownership (partial and total) 
Alimarket Hotel and 
Catering Yearbook 
Family involvement 
(1) NFBs; (2) Firms with low 
family involvement; (3) Family-
managed firms; (4) Family-owned 
firms; (5) Family-owned and 
family-managed firms 
Alimarket Hotel and 
Catering Yearbook 
Formal institutional distance Kogut and Singh (1988) index  




Cultural distance Kogut and Singh (1988) index 
Extended Hofstede’s 
model of cultural 
differences with six 
dimensions  
International experience 
Number of years since the firm’s 
internationalization process began  
Ratio of rooms abroad to total 
rooms of each hotel chain 
Alimarket Hotel and 
Catering Yearbook 
Firm size 
Average income of each hotel 
chain in the last three years 
Alimarket Hotel and 
Catering Yearbook 
Family generation 
Current generation of the family 
running the firm 
Firm’s corporate 
website 
Family CEO  
(1) The CEO is a family member; 
(0) Otherwise 
Alimarket Hotel and 
Catering Yearbook 






Table 3: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Variable Mean SD VIF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Entry mode 2.84 1.22 N.A. 1         
2. Family involvement 2.93 1.59 1.65 0.085 1        
3. Formal institutional 
distance 
1.06 1.01 2.70 -0.159 0.113 1       
4. Cultural distance 7.13 3.84 1.79 0.113 0.106 0.477 1      
5. International experience 
(years) 
20.83 9.03 4.43 -0.020 0.189 0.002 0.169 1     
6. International experience 
(rooms) 
58.62 18.86 2.38 0.193 -0.305 -0.023 0.132 0.212 1    
7. Firm size 2.82 0.69 3.29 -0.201 -0.002 -0.020 -0.017 0.687 0.277 1   
8. Family generation 2.51 1.02 2.65 0.070 -0.488 0.006 -0.43 0.591 0.684 0.168 1  
9. Family CEO 0.96 0.19 1.16 0.036 0.085 0.014 0.086 0.265 0.101 0.290 0.066 1 
10. Market attractiveness 4.09 0.59 1.95 0.263 -0.123 -0.592 -0.43 0.073 0.125 0.017 0.051 0.082 
Correlations over /0.073/ are significant with p< 0.05 
Correlations over /0.085/ are significant with p< 0.01 
 
 
Table 4: Ordinal logistic regression results of entry mode choice 
Explanatory variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Formal institutional distance  -0.564*** -7.472*** -0.526*** -7.766*** 
Cultural distance   0.094*** 0.035 -1.037*** 0.220 
Moderating variable      
Family involvement   0.672** -2.127*** -1.812*** -1.843*** 
Interactions      
Formal institutional distance X 
Family involvement 
  1.728***  1.796*** 
Cultural distance X Family 
involvement 
   0.269*** -0.044 
Control variables     
International experience (years) 0.234*** 0.175*** 0.256*** 0.224*** 0.255*** 
International experience (rooms) 0.247*** 0.175*** 0.310*** 0.243*** 0.304*** 
Firm size -12.273*** -7.700*** -15.212*** -11.867*** -14.919*** 
Family generation  -2.901*** -1.928*** -3.740*** -2.853*** -3.668*** 
Family CEO  9.813*** 5.367*** 11.323*** 8.690*** 11.140*** 

















Table 5: Robustness tests 
 
Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b Model 2c Model 3c Model 4c 
Explanatory variables Explanatory variables Explanatory variables Explanatory variables Explanatory variables Explanatory variables Explanatory variables Explanatory variables Explanatory variables 
Formal inst. distance  
(-0.679***) 
Formal inst. distance  
 (-0.930***) 
Formal inst. distance  
 (-0.691***) 
Formal inst. distance  
 (-0.666***) 
Formal inst. distance  
 (-4.140***) 
Formal inst. distance  
 (-0.526***) 
Formal inst. distance  
 (-0.715***) 
Formal inst. distance  
 (-8.055***) 










































Interactions Interactions  Interactions Interactions 
 




Formal inst. distance X 
Family involvement 
(0.848***) 
  Formal inst. distance 




Cultural distance X 
Family management  
(0.001) 
  
Cultural distance X 
Family involvement 
(0.269***) 
  Cultural distance X 
Family involvement 
(0.152**) 
Control variables Control variables Control variables Control variables Control variables Control variables Control variables Control variables Control variables 
International 
experience (years)  
(0.327***) 
International 
experience (years)  
(0.362***) 
International 






























experience (rooms)  
(0.047***) 
International 
experience (rooms)  
(0.085***) 
International 
experience (rooms)  
(0.243***) 
International 
experience (rooms)  
(0.156***) 
International 
experience (rooms)  
(0.188***) 
International 










Firm size  
(-2.945***)  
Firm size  
(-11.867***)  
Firm size (income) 
(11.105***)  
Firm size (income) 
(14.147***)  






































Market attractiveness  
(0.486**) 
Market attractiveness  
(0.463**) 
Market attractiveness  
(0.494***) 












   
  
 Number of stars 
(0.036) 
Number of stars 
(0.080) 
Number of stars 
(0.061) 
Number of countries 
(-0.452***) 
Number of countries 
(-0.455***) 
Number of countries 
(-0.450***) 
Firm size  
(employees) 
(-13.779***) 
Firm size  
(employees) 
(-17.925***) 



































***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
